Showing posts with label Brazil. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Brazil. Show all posts

December 02, 2013

Lending carnival

Public banks in Brazil



Increasing fiscal deficits and a higher chance of downgrading of its sovereign ratings are main factors behind the recent pledges of austerity on lending plans by public banks in Brazil. Finance Minister Mantega announced a 20% reduction on lending by BNDES next year, shortly after the IMF warned Brazil on the rapid expansion by its three major state owned banks.


BNDES (long term financing of development projects), Caixa (housing loans) and Banco do Brasil (rural credit) boosted their lending 25% per annum on average in 2011 and 2012, compared to 10% of private banks (domestic and foreign). They enlarged their books further this year, overtaking private lenders participation, reaching 50.7% share of the USD 1.09tr market.

As reported by the IMF´s mission last October: 
 “The substantial credit expansion in recent years by public banks has been financed significantly with transfers from the Treasury. Since the global financial crisis, the Treasury has provided subsidized direct lending to public banks, mostly to BNDES"
“The fiscal cost of government lending has also increased as the long term interest rate the rate public banks pay on obligations to the Treasury was reduced by 100 bps to 5 percent during 2012, with the lower rate applying to all outstanding loans”.
For those so called Sustainable investment loans, nominal rates are still as low as 3.5% while 12 month inflation is a higher 5.8%.

Government and IMF concerns added to earlier action by Moody´s when it lowered BNDES and Caxias’s ratings by two notches, to Baa2 last March. The deterioration of core capital indicators was a key factor in the downgrading decisions; however public banks were still in compliance with minimum regulatory Tier 1 requirement of 5.5% of capital adequacy, reflecting the usually healthy performance of a fairly young portfolio in its rapid growth phase. 

Brazil´s case illustrates very well the typical tension the development banks are subjected to: even if loans were not subsidized and fiscal costs were negligible- (often not the case, indeed) - the pressure to use lending as a development policy tool conflicts with banking supervision standards and prudential rules. This is especially so when government-promoted loans would perpetuate beyond what either counter-cyclical or market-failure motives would justify.


For the sake of financial soundness, Brazil is rightly signaling the need to curb public lending expansion. However, still needs to address implicit subsidies in government funded loans at negative real interest rates. The latter harms the efficiency of investments- (e.g. projects developed on the grounds of artificially cheap funding). 

As stated in the recent OECD recent country report when suggesting a desirable phasing out of BNDES lending to large corporations:   

“The development of private credit markets has much potential to relieve credit constraints and improve the allocation of credit”

As important as allocation efficiency, below market interest rates in public lending are also unfair - (e.g. the more you manage to borrow, the more you gain). Interestingly enough, 69 % of BNDES loan portfolio is concentrated in the 60 nation´s biggest corporations.

As much as financial crisis may burn tax payers’ money when rescue formulas are implemented to bail out private financial entities, public banks represent a potential fiscal destabilizer as well. Several developing countries have suffered from the fiscal burden of bad lending with honorable purposes, most notably by public but poorly regulated development banks and agencies. 

A case in point we learned first-hand in Chile: when the Chilean CORFO shut down its direct lending operations in the nineties, the best bid received in the auction of its old portfolio was a meager 12.8% of the face value

Since suffering from such an adverse policies, many development banks have moved from direct to on-lending. Chile pioneered on-lending schemes : long term funding was auctioned to, and then channeled through, private commercial banks, the latter absorbing the credit risks while the public bank or agency might provide some partial collateral to certain small commercial borrowers. As reported for Latin America, these reforms, together with the public provision of advisory and other services to small-medium scale borrowers have resulted in better performance of commercial loans in recent years. That is why, credit boosting through public direct lending as reported in the Brazilian case, represents not only a fiscal threat but a step back in improving development banks´ good practices.

As an analyst phrased when commenting the OECD report: “Brazil's wasteful state bank can learn from Chile”.


September 01, 2013

Aussies, Loonies and other central banks´friends


  A spanish version published in América Economía
english versions also available at Financial Times Alphaville and SimplyNoRisk
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"There is no sphere of human thought in which it is easier to show superficial cleverness and the appearance of wisdom than in discussing questions of currency and exchange".

The famous Churchill´s sentence, very much in place when it comes to guessing when one particular currency shall weaken or strengthen. What we do know better is that in minimizing the chance of capital losses from currency fluctuations, a well diversified portfolio continue to be the cheapest and foremost risk management tool. That, the old Markowitz corollary, is what central banks have gradually put in practice over recent years.

Non-reserve currencies are nowadays a much higher proportion of international reserves. This is especially the case of central banks in emerging and developing countries where recent turbulence has not obscured the main fact: the share of non-reserve currencies- (all but the four SDR components plus the Swiss Franc)- reached 8 percent of allocated reserves this year. As a proportion, this is about four times higher than in 2007

Leading the new currency friends are Australian aussies and Canadian loonies (about 1.6% each). Reflecting its importance, the IMF´s  COFER report recently began to publish them individually. Among central banks,it is also well known  that Norwegian, Swedish and Danish Kroner; Korean Won and off-shore Renminbis are following suit.

Higher currency diversification has been facilitated by the increased level of reserves itself.  They have raised well above adequacy level standards (i.e. months of imports, short term debt service, size over GDP). Therefore, a satiated liquidity tranche has unleashed higher degrees of freedom at the investment tranches. The case for holding net foreign exchange assets in US dollars-(and the other three composing the SDR basket, for  that matter)- weakened. More so when fundamentals remain fragile in most countries which issue anchor-currencies. No wonder, several central banks are known to hold CAD and AUD denominated assets (e.g. Brazil: 9.1 percent; Chile: 13 percent; among many others).

Interestingly, last 12 months performance of  those two popular non anchors disappoints. The AUD and CAD spot rates show 14 and 6 percent losses against the USD, respectively.

Are these AUD and CAD losses a reason to dismiss these new currency friends altogether? 
Of course, not.
The role of the newcomers is not to add capital gains but to cushion exchange rate volatility, hopefully bringing with them a dose of negative correlation to the returns on the currency portfolio. The Won and Euro appear to fulfill that role, gaining 3 and 6 percent, respectively.

Another way to evaluate performance and pursue asset allocation for investment tranches would focus on the local currency as the numeraire. This is becoming common practice among central banks that care for their status of independence and core capital preservation on their books. Even inflation adjusted domestic currency is utilized.

As an example, the figure below illustrates the case for Chile. When measured in local currency units, the AUD continued to be a drag but the CAD parity becomes Peso neutral, while Euro and Won holdings being a positive

Aussies and Loonies versus Euro and Won, against the Chilean Peso
(click to enlarge)








Would it be better to diversify away of AUD and CAD? 
May be. 
Empirically, nobody could be sure about observed variance-covariance patterns. Correlations may shift or even reverse over time. 
Conceptually however, the following asset allocation rule would be very much in order: a central bank from a commodity exporter country would be better hedged against currency risk when the value of its reserves would move opposite to commodity prices. Therefore, beyond liquidity considerations, Aussies - (among other so called commodity-currencies)- would not be best friends for central banks at commodity exporting countries. And good friends are needed to help you cope with pressures over your international reserves.